Fake Voicemail Lures Sent Under Real Organizations' Addresses
Fake Voicemail Lures Sent Under Real Organizations' Addresses
Between December 2025 and August 2026, fake voicemail notices were sent under the addresses of 13 real organizations, each through a separate SendGrid account. The organizations included small businesses, nonprofits, a congregation and a public school. In six cases, the fake notice appeared directly above genuine mail from that organization's own account, establishing that whoever sent it had the mailbox. The notice design changed with almost every organization. The link changed too, moving between a Microsoft marketing form, two different click trackers and five landing-page builders. The delivery remained the same: a real organization's address, a separate SendGrid account for each organization and, in every message whose headers survive, authentication that passed SPF and DKIM for SendGrid rather than for the organization.
Key Takeaways
- We observed fake voicemail, missed-call and recorded-message notices sent under 13 organizations' addresses between 2025-12-05 and 2026-08-06, each through a different SendGrid account.
- Six of the 13 carried genuine content from the organization's own mailbox below the lure: a quoted internal thread, a staff signature or an out-of-office reply. Mailbox access is established for those six.
- The SendGrid account numbers rise with the send date across the whole set. Whether those accounts belonged to the victims or were set up around the time of each send is not established.
- Every message we could decode was signed by
sendgrid[.]netwith a SendGrid return-path, so neither check aligned with the visible sender. Where receivers recorded a DMARC result, it failed under ap=nonepolicy that asks for no action. - Nine lures linked through Mailchimp's own system click tracker to builder pages or to one operator-registered domain. The account number in that tracker belongs to Mailchimp and is not an indicator on its own.
Background
Fake voicemail notices are an old credential lure. Zscaler documented Microsoft 365 voicemail campaigns in 2020 and again in 2022. Check Point counted more than 58,000 fake voicemail-transcript emails sent to about 7,800 organizations in one two-week window. The pretext works because the alert appears to come from the recipient's own phone system. Its sole purpose is to get the recipient to press a button.
These lures were sent under the addresses of real organizations through Twilio SendGrid, a high-volume email API used by organizations for newsletters and notifications. Phishing through SendGrid accounts has been reported repeatedly, including by Kaspersky in 2024 and by Mimecast, which described one wave reaching 5,272 organizations between December 2025 and January 2026. Twilio's own guidance on compromised accounts notes that attackers who gain access often add API keys or sub-users so they can continue sending.
Sending through SendGrid predictably affects email authentication. SPF checks whether the sending IP may send for the return-path domain. Here, the return-path is SendGrid's, so SPF passes. DKIM checks a signature bound to a signing domain. SendGrid signs the message, so DKIM passes too. DMARC, defined in RFC 7489, adds alignment: the domain that passed SPF or DKIM must match the domain in the visible From: header. When an account sends without SendGrid domain authentication, both passes belong to sendgrid[.]net, so neither aligns. Two checks pass, the third fails, and the domain's published policy determines whether the failure matters.
The lures used the services below. None of them is an indicator:
- Mailchimp click tracking rewrites each link in a send to point at Mailchimp's servers, records the click and redirects to the real destination. Mailchimp says it keeps redirecting links for free-plan accounts so it can screen out malicious ones. The tracked links here have the shape
click.mailchimp[.]com/track/click/<account>/<host>?p=<encoded payload>.list-manage[.]comcarries each Mailchimp customer's hosted forms and a tenant-level click redirector. - ActiveCampaign (
<account>.ac-page[.]com), Zoho LandingPage (<name>.zoholandingpage[.]com), Brevo (<name>.sibpages[.]com), Klaviyo (<company>.myklpages[.]com) and Wix (<account>.wixsite[.]com) host customer landing pages on subdomains of the vendor's domain, with TLS included and nothing to register. One subdomain belongs to one customer account. - Microsoft Dynamics 365 Customer Insights can publish a marketing form as a standalone page on Microsoft's CDN, live as soon as it is published. The forms here were served from
assets-usa.mkt.dynamics[.]com.
Discovery and Infrastructure
Individually, each lure looked like ordinary mail from a sender with a clean history. The organizations had aged domains and real staff, and the messages carried valid signatures. The same combination of features appeared across organizations with nothing else in common:
- a voicemail, missed-call or recording pretext with a single button;
- delivery through SendGrid with a
sendgrid[.]netreturn-path and asendgrid[.]netDKIM signature; - a link that pointed at a trusted platform, never directly at operator-registered infrastructure;
- in about half the cases, genuine content from the organization's own mailbox below the notice.
Each feature is common on its own. Across 13 unrelated organizations over eight months, the combination forms one consistent delivery pattern. The evidence defines that pattern, but it does not establish whether one sender or several used it.
| Month | Organizations | Link mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| December 2025 | 2 | Dynamics 365 Customer Insights standalone form |
| February 2026 | 1 | Mailchimp system click tracker to an operator-registered domain |
| March 2026 | 1 | SendGrid click tracker, destination unresolved |
| April 2026 | 3 | Mailchimp system click tracker to an ActiveCampaign page (2); another Mailchimp customer's list tracker (1) |
| June 2026 | 4 | Mailchimp system click tracker to ActiveCampaign, Zoho, Brevo and Klaviyo pages |
| July 2026 | 1 | Mailchimp system click tracker to a Wix site |
| August 2026 | 1 | Mailchimp system click tracker to a Wix site |
Across those 13 organizations, we observed hundreds of lure deliveries.
How It Works
Each lure is a short notification about a new voice message, a missed call or a recording added to the account. It is sent through SendGrid under a staff address at the organization to outside recipients. The message contains one button, labelled "Play Message", "Open Recording", "View Message" or similar. In eight of the nine lures from mid-April onward, that button pointed at Mailchimp's system click tracker, which redirected to a page on a landing-page builder.
A sanitized header block showing the pattern:
From: "[voicemail-style display name]" <[organization staff address]>
Subject: New VM Received
Return-Path: <bounces+[account]-[token]-[recipient]@sendgrid[.]net>
Authentication-Results: spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sendgrid[.]net;
dkim=pass header.i=@sendgrid[.]net;
dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=[organization domain]
CTA: http[:]//click.mailchimp[.]com/track/click/30010842/[builder subdomain]?p=[encoded payload]
The visible link was always an address on a trusted platform. The one operator-registered domain we observed, fr1bel[.]com, appeared only as a destination inside a tracker link, never as a URL on its own.
Sample Lures
These four representative notices cover the main styles. All recipient data and victim identities have been removed, and every indicator is defanged. The lure under nearly every organization's address used a different design.
Email, a plain PBX-style mailbox alert with a fabricated caller in the display field (February 2026):
From: "[fabricated caller] AP" <[fabricated number]>
Subject: New mailbox 108 from "[victim organization] AP" <[fabricated number]>
Body:
Account ID: [account id]
You have a new msg in mailbox 108 [recipient]
From: "[fabricated caller] AP" <[fabricated number]> on [date] [time]
[ Press/Click to Access Voicemail ]
Email, an invented secure-voicemail brand prepended above a real internal thread from the organization's mailbox (March 2026):
From: "[invented brand] Priority" <[organization staff address]>
Subject: [invented brand] Secure: New Voicemail
Body:
SECURE AUDIO TRANSMISSION
New Voicemail Received
Recipient: [recipient]
Caller ID: +1 ••• ••• ••[redacted]
Date & Time: [date] • [time]
[ Access Secure Message ]
Caller identity partially masked for privacy • Authorized access required
On [date], [staff member] <[organization address]> wrote:
[genuine internal correspondence, redacted]
Email, a "communication log" recording notice with a fabricated caller name and number (June 2026):
From: [organization staff address]
Subject: Consolidated Communication logs
Body:
Audio Notification
Greetings,
A new recording from [fabricated caller]-[city] ([phone]) has been added to your account.
Date: [date] Time: [time] (EST)
[ Open Recording ]
Wasn't expecting this message? Please change your system preferences.
Email, a missed-call notice with the staff member's genuine out-of-office text left below it (July 2026):
From: "[staff member]" <[organization staff address]>
Subject: Missed Call: 1 Voice Mail Notificaiton
Body:
..............................................................
[ PLAY AUDIO ]
--------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 Secs
[genuine out-of-office message, redacted]
"Notificaiton" is misspelled in the original subject.
Technical Analysis
One SendGrid Account per Organization
Every lure was sent through a different SendGrid account, identified by the account number embedded in its bounce address. We have that number for all 13: from the raw headers for 11 and from the original message decodes for the two whose headers are no longer stored. That gives 13 accounts for 13 organizations. The organizations had no relationship to each other, but their account numbers did. When sorted by send date, the numbers rise steadily from the December lures to the August one. The two December lures, sent on the same day under two different organizations' addresses, came from accounts numbered fewer than 7,000 apart.
How these accounts came to exist is not established. Two explanations fit the evidence:
- The accounts belonged to the organizations and were taken over along with their mailboxes.
- The accounts were opened near the time of each send and attached to the organization's address.
The rising numbers and the adjacent December pair fit the second explanation more readily, but account numbering alone does not prove when or by whom an account was opened. The evidence establishes something narrower. In six cases, the sender had access to the organization's mailbox. In every case, the mail left through a SendGrid account dedicated to that one organization's address.
Authentication Was a Property of the Delivery Path
Every lure whose headers we could decode, 11 of the 13, had the same structure: a return-path on sendgrid[.]net and a DKIM signature with header.i=@sendgrid[.]net. SPF and DKIM passed for SendGrid's domain, not for the organization's. None of those 11 accounts had SendGrid domain authentication in place.
| Authentication result | Organizations |
|---|---|
SPF pass, DKIM pass (sendgrid[.]net), DMARC fail at p=none |
8 |
SPF pass, DKIM pass (sendgrid[.]net), no DMARC result recorded |
3 |
| Authentication headers no longer stored | 2 |
In all eight cases with a recorded DMARC result, the organization published p=none, a policy that tells receivers to report alignment failures and take no action. The other three recorded no DMARC result at all. The lures therefore arrived with a valid signature and a passing SPF check, while the domain's own policy told receivers to ignore the DMARC failure. For a defender, that failure means the mail did not come through the organization's authenticated domain. It does not mean the organization sent it, nor does it mean anyone else did.
Link Destinations Rotated
The link varied more than any other part of the set. Across 13 organizations, we observed five link mechanisms. The largest, used in eight of the 13 lures, pointed at five different landing-page builders.
| Link mechanism | Organizations | Where the click went |
|---|---|---|
| Dynamics 365 Customer Insights standalone form | 2 | A form on assets-usa.mkt.dynamics[.]com |
| Mailchimp system click tracker to an operator-registered domain | 1 | fr1bel[.]com |
| Mailchimp system click tracker to a builder page | 8 | ActiveCampaign (3), Wix (2), Zoho LandingPage (1), Brevo (1), Klaviyo (1) |
| SendGrid click tracker | 1 | Unresolved |
Another Mailchimp customer's list-manage click tracker |
1 | Unresolved |
Each mechanism placed a reputable, TLS-valid platform domain in the visible link. In 12 of the 13 cases, the end of the chain was also a platform: a Microsoft form, a builder subdomain or a tracker we could not follow. Only one lure ended on a domain registered for the purpose.
Builder Tenants
The eight builder pages fell into two shapes.
| Tenant label shape | Pages | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Matches a real organization's name | 3 | Either that organization's own account, used without its knowledge, or a lookalike account. In one case the label is the sending organization's own name. |
| Reads like a real name, not confirmed | 1 | Unresolved |
| Random or default-style handle | 4 | Creator not established |
A page on <real organization>.ac-page[.]com or <victim name>.myklpages[.]com is not evidence against that organization. For every page, the evidence does not show whether the sender created the account or took it over. Seven of the eight returned errors when we checked; one still serves a bare placeholder page. Each builder assigns one subdomain per customer account, so a block belongs on the specific subdomain, never on the vendor's domain.
Mailchimp's Own Click Tracker in These Lures
Nine lures contained links of the form click.mailchimp[.]com/track/click/30010842/<host>?p=<payload>. That number is Mailchimp's own system account. It appears in system messages that Mailchimp sends for its customers, including subscription confirmations and unsubscribe notices, from a very large number of unrelated, legitimate senders. A link containing it is ordinary Mailchimp traffic. On its own, it says nothing about who sent a message or whether two messages are related.
The lures differ from Mailchimp's own mail in three ways:
| Mailchimp system email | These lures | |
|---|---|---|
| Delivery | Mailchimp's own transactional infrastructure (Mandrill), with a matching bounce address | SendGrid, sendgrid[.]net return-path |
| Tracker destination | The customer's list-manage pages, Mailchimp account pages or the sender's own site |
Third-party landing-page builders or an operator-registered domain |
| Sender | The list owner or Mailchimp | A staff address at an unrelated organization |
The p= parameter is an encoded payload naming the full destination URL, with a timestamp close to the send time. How the lures came to contain Mailchimp system-tracker links to those destinations is not established. An open-redirect weakness in the tracker would explain it. Links generated through some Mailchimp customer account would also explain it. The evidence here does not distinguish between the two. One other lure used a click tracker belonging to a different Mailchimp customer, with the destination unresolved.
Genuine Mailbox Content Below the Lure
Six of the 13 lures contained genuine content from the organization's account directly beneath the fake notice. Two included complete internal threads quoted below. The other four included a staff member's real signature block, contact details, a scheduling link or an out-of-office reply. This is consistent with the lure being written inside the organization's own mail client or created by replying to or forwarding a real message. It is the strongest evidence in the set that the sender had the mailbox.
It is also easy to spot. A notice that claims to come from a phone system but continues into someone's quoted reply or staff signature did not come from a phone system.
Registration Profile
| Domain group | Registered | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Organization domains with WHOIS data (9 of 13) | Years earlier | Aged domains of real organizations, no adverse history |
fr1bel[.]com |
2025-09-22 | NameSilo, Cloudflare nameservers; used about five months later; now on registrar hold and no longer resolving |
Everything else in the chain belonged to Microsoft, Twilio, Intuit, ActiveCampaign, Zoho, Brevo, Klaviyo and Wix. Across eight months, the only purpose-registered domain we observed was fr1bel[.]com, and it appeared only inside a tracker link.
The Legitimate Twin
Cloud-PBX platforms such as RingCentral, 8x8, Vonage, Zoom Phone and Dialpad forward voicemail to email from the customer's own domain, often through an ESP. Those forwards can produce the same SPF-pass, DKIM-pass, DMARC-fail result and the same "New Voicemail" subjects. The content is what separates them. A genuine forward uses one vendor template from top to bottom, with a real caller ID and the vendor's own links. A lure is a short notice, often unbranded or presented under an invented brand, whose only link goes to a tracker or builder page.
What We Could Not Establish
- Who owned or opened the 13 SendGrid accounts, and when.
- How the Mailchimp system-tracker links were produced.
- Whether one sender or several used the pattern.
- The final destination for two lures, and the authentication headers for two organizations.
- What the builder pages served at the time of each send. All but one are now offline.
Detection Observations
Based on this set, an analyst or mail administrator reviewing a suspect voicemail notice can check the following:
- The authentication result alone proves little. SPF pass, DKIM signed by the ESP's shared domain and a DMARC failure at
p=nonealso describe legitimate cloud-PBX forwards and many small-organization newsletters. - Examine the template and the link together. Every lure here was a short notice whose only link went to a click tracker, a marketing form or a landing-page builder, never to a phone vendor's own domain.
- Read past the notice. In six of the 13, the organization's own mail continued underneath it, which no phone-system alert does.
- A Mailchimp system-tracker link is normal in Mailchimp's own mail. In these lures, it arrived through SendGrid and pointed at third-party pages.
- Handle builder pages by subdomain. Several carried a real organization's name, and one carried the sending organization's own.
Indicators of Compromise
Only operator-registered infrastructure is listed. The 13 organizations, their addresses and SendGrid accounts, and the builder-page tenants, several of which carry real organizations' names, are victims or third-party accounts of unestablished ownership and are intentionally omitted. The platforms involved are legitimate services, not indicators.
Domains
| Value | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
fr1bel[.]com |
Landing | Registered 2025-09-22; reached only as the destination inside a Mailchimp click-tracker link on a February 2026 lure; now on registrar hold |
MITRE Fight Fraud Framework Mapping
This mapping follows the MITRE Fight Fraud Framework (F3) v1.1, https://ctid.mitre.org/fraud. F3 focuses on financial-account fraud, so a credential lure like this maps only partially. Unmapped stages are noted rather than forced.
| F3 Tactic | Technique | ID |
|---|---|---|
| Resource Development | Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts | T1586.002 |
| Resource Development | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | T1583.001 |
| Initial Access | Phishing | T1660 |
The email-account row is based on the six organizations whose genuine mailbox content appears under the lure. Routing every link through trusted-platform trackers, forms and page builders fits the Stealth tactic, but F3 has no discrete technique for it, so no identifier is given.
Conclusion
The newest lures we observed, in July and August 2026, sent clicks to Wix pages from two more organizations' addresses, each through another SendGrid account. By then, the set had used five link mechanisms and nearly as many notice designs as there were organizations. Three parts remained consistent: a separate SendGrid account for each organization's address, a p=none DMARC policy in every case where a result was recorded and, in six of the 13, the organization's own mail beneath a notice claiming to come from a phone system.
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